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II. BRANZBURG AND THE PROTECTION OF
REPORTERS' SOURCES
JAMES C. GOODALE*
There is a great deal of misunderstanding today concerning the
subpoena of reporters' notes, sources, and out-takes,' much of which
is due to the confusion surrounding the interpretation of the Supreme
Court's decision in Branzburg v. Hayes. 2 I believe the popular concep-
tion of this decision is to the effect that reporters' sources must always
be disclosed in any type of litigation, but, in fact, that was not the
issue before the Court. Rather, the holding of the case concerned the
power to subpoena materials in the possession of reporters, including
out-takes.
There were actually four separate cases before the Court, but
combined and styled under the name of Branzburg v. Hayes. First,
there was Caldwell v. United States3 which involved a reporter who
had been subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury in California. The
reporter initially argued that if he testified, he should have a qualified
privilege. This privilege was ultimately recognized by the lower courts,
but prior to appearing before the grand jury, the reporter decided that
regardless of what he would actually have to reveal his mere appear-
ance before the grand jury would compromise his relationship with his
sources. Since they would have no way of knowing what the reporter
actually revealed in the closed session, they might logically believe that
he had given up all his "confidential" information. So the reporter
chose not to appear at all. Thus, the only issue appealed in this case
was whether the reporter could be compelled to appear and not what
he could be compelled to disclose.
The second and third cases involved a young Harvard Law
School graduate named Branzburg who was working as a reporter in
Kentucky. In the first of these cases, Branzburg, who while working
on a story had observed people processing hashish, argued to the state
courts that a Kentucky statute protecting reporters from revealing
sources allowed him to refuse to testify concerning these observations.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals, however, held that observations are
not sources and thus the statute afforded no protection to Branzburg. 4
* Executive Vice President of the New York Times; Legal Counsel for the Times in both the
Caldwell and Pentagon Papers cases.
1. These three items should be clearly differentiated. Reporters' notes are memoranda
commonly made while gathering information for a story. Sources are the people from whom the
information is gathered. Out-takes are those portions of a completed story which are removed
prior to actual publication either as part of normal editing or for purposes such as maintaining
confidentiality.
2. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
3. 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
4. Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970).
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Although no explicit mention of it was made by the court, they
implicitly recognized this issue as one of testifying about out-takes.
Although there was an attempt to get Branzburg to reveal sources
in the other case involving the same reporter, the Kentucky statute
protected him from compelled disclosure. But Branzburg further ar-
gued that, as in Caldwell, he should not even have to appear. It was
only the appearance argument that was appealed to the Supreme
Court.
The fourth case joined in the Supreme Court style of Branzburg v.
Hayes was In re Pappas.5 In that case, Pappas, a reporter, had
witnessed certain events during a riot outside a Black Panther office in
Massachusetts. He testified in front of a grand jury once, under
subpoena, as to what he saw. He was subpoenaed a second time to
testify as to what he saw when he later entered the office, but Pappas
refused to answer the subpoena.
Thus, the Supreme Court in Branzburg had before it three cases
presenting only appearance issues and one case presenting only an
out-take issue; there were no cases involving revelation of sources. The
high court held only that the reporters must appear and, in the first of
the Branzburg cases, that a reporter witnessing a crime was required
to testify concerning that crime.
I suggest that after the Supreme Court decided the case, Caldwell,
Pappas, and Branzburg (in the second of his cases) could have re-
turned to the lower courts and still argued that although they were
now required to appear, they had a qualified privilege to refuse to offer
testimony on much of what was given and told to them on a confiden-
tial basis. I further suggest that the Supreme Court recognized this
qualified privilege in its Branzburg decision.
Under Branzburg, the privilege exists unless three conditions can
be met. First, there must be a showing that the testimony sought is
relevant and material to a particular case. Second, the information
must not be obtainable by alternate sources. Third, there must be a
compelling national interest in the testimony. This test was adopted by
four of the Supreme Court justices, and parts one and three were
adopted by Justice Powell.
This three-part test has been generally recognized in the cases
following Branzburg.6 I am aware of twenty-four cases since then
dealing with compulsory testimony of reporters. In almost all, the
three-part test was urged on the court; in a substantial number, the
test was applied.
It has been suggested that an alternative to this judicially created
qualified privilege would be some type of legislatively created shield
law which would add clarity and uniformity to the protection offered
5. 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971).
6. E.g., Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972); Democratic National
Committee v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973).
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to reporters. But such legislation, in my opinion, would encounter
great difficulty in passing through Congress. And even if it were
enacted by the states, I am not sure precisely what it should contain,
although I believe any attempt to draft such legislation should prop-
erly reflect the treatment which the courts are currently giving the
issue of reporters' privilege.
